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ABSTRACT
Information security technology has become more important in preventing and
protecting organizational digital assets, and employees are often considered the last line
of defense. However, employees at all levels have to face and deal with the complexity,
overload, and uncertainty of information security technology in their jobs every day.
Although information security technology could benefit the organization and individual
employees as it is critical to building and strengthening protection mechanisms for
organizational digital assets and employees’ data, it could also negatively affect
employees’ emotions and work accomplishments.
This study examines the two effects of psychological techno-stress responses
(security-techno distress and security-techno eustress) are caused by information security
techno-stressors, which eventually influence security counterproductive behavior. In
addition, a quantitative investigation with a cross-sectional survey design to collect data
that measured items reflect the constructs discussed in the above section will be
considered to evaluate the hindrance and challenge security techno-stressors that predict
emotional security-techno distress and security techno-eustress response that may lead to
the security counterproductive behavior. The findings suggested that security job
demands are positively associated with security-techno distress and security-techno
eustress, suggesting that if there is no demand, there is no challenge or motivation for
employees to improve their security best practice. Meanwhile, security job resources
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This study has theoretical and practical implications for information security scholars and
practitioners. It had negative significant impacts on security-techno distress and positive
significant effects on eustress, which suggested that these factors encourage employees to
prepare well for challenges interacting with information security technology. Overall, this
research increases the understanding of information security technostress and the
essential role of distress and eustress on security counterproductive behavior.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The growing prevalence of high-profile cybersecurity attacks associated with
potential data breaches impact organizations and consumers since companies and
consumers rely on online networks to conduct business transactions and communication
(Spitzer, 2020). At the same time, the growing risk of potential security breaches pushes
organizations and consumers to increase investment in information security technology to
battle various security threats. According to a Gartner forecast report, worldwide
spending on information security by 2022 was expected to reach a total of $133.8 billion
(Moore, 2020). In the U.S., revenue for security-related software and services is
estimated at $20.8 billion over the five years to 2025 and is forecasted to sustain an
annual growth rate of 4.1 % (Spitzer, 2020). Firms invested heavily in information
security technology to mitigate or prevent security incidents and threats by strengthening
new security management and critical information control. Nevertheless, a cyber-stress
report’s findings showed that 81 percent of Americans still admit that cybersecurity
issues (e.g., virus, ransomware attack, social engineering attacks) have drawn increasing
attention and discussion in organizations and consumers (Kaspersky, 2019). The ongoing
anxiety of ever-growing cyber threat offense and organizations’ defense aims to protect
data stored on Information Technology (IT) devices (e.g., computers, mobile devices)
and cloud servers devices and data from unknown threats underlies our long-term
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cyber-stress issues as the advancements in information security technology provide us
with incredible opportunities and quickly cause people to feel lost and stressed. Stress is
defined as the ongoing interaction between an individual and the surrounding
environment; an individual perceives it as taxing that exceed available resources or
affects the individual’s well-being and behavior (Cooper et al., 2001; Tarafdar et al.,
2017). More importantly, stress costs U.S.-based employers an estimated $300 billion
each year, according to the American Institute of Stress (AIS, 2019). The individual
consequences of workplace stress are physical and psychological issues that often affect
employees’ work performance and lead to employee turnover, disengagement, and
absenteeism.
The information security (InfoSec) literature suggests that human elements are
considered the last line of defense and the weakest link against cyberattacks (Kirsch &
Boss, 2007; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2014; Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019).
Although information security technology has been heavily invested and users adopt new
technological devices to support compliant information security systems procedures (e.g.,
email encryption, virtual private networks, identity management, multiple-factor
authentication), the number of systems that employees need to use increases with specific
information systems security requirements, and the mandatory technical prompts
(system-specific criteria for changing password) or adjustable (e.g., computer or system
locks itself automatically after a certain period), people who are affected by the new
information systems security are largely ignored (Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019).
Moreover, findings suggest that conflicts between complying with cybersecurity
policies and prioritizing work-related tasks are important drivers of non-compliance.
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(Kirlappos et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2016). The current cyber threat landscape requires
organizations and employees to improve cybersecurity approaches and evaluate
information security technology’ effectiveness for avoiding technology overload; thus, it
is important to help employees tackle information security negative stress response while
at the same time strengthening understanding of benefits from information security
technology and process have in place (Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019).
D’Arcy et al. (2014) derived security-related stress (SRS) from the technostress
literature. They found that SRS has a significant positive relationship with moral
disengagement to predict information security policy (ISP) violating behavior. However,
compounding this program, information security technology stress often bleeds over into
employees’ offices with the potential to security and privacy breaches penetrated or
circumvents information security controls embedded into individual information
technology work devices (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2018; Thompson et al., 2017).
Moreover, employees need to build up their information security knowledge to protect
organizational digital assets since the current information security ongoing threat
landscapes require constant updates on information security technology that require
individual capabilities of self-motivated in adapting and learning new information
security technology (Karjalainen et al., 2019).
A stressor is an event, demand, stimulus, or condition that an individual may
experience in the workplace environment (Cooper et al., 2001; Cooper & Dewe, 2008).
Little research has examined security-related techno stressors. Previous studies developed
security technostress models on general information security stress perceptions (i.e., role
stress related to information security) and linked them to security compliance intention
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(Hwang & Cha, 2018; Hwang & Cha, 2021). Demands are characteristics associated with
physiological and psychological costs within the workplace environment (Bakker &
Demerouti, 2007; Bakker & Demerouti, 2017). Stressors often stimulate an individual’s
stress responses, which eventually influence psychological and behavioral outcomes
(Simmons & Nelson, 2001; Hargrove et al., 2013; Califf et al., 2020). This study
investigates the antecedents and outcomes of two distinct types of information security
technostress sub-process: security-techno distress, which results in negative responses to
stressors, and security techno-eustress, which results in positive responses to stressors.
Building a holistic of security techno-stressors that influence both security-techno distress
and security-techno eustress responses, the theoretical framework of Job DemandsResources was incorporated with the technostress trifecta to identify and examine
empirically challenge and hindrance security-related techno stressors. Their association
with negative and positive psychological stress responses (security-techno distress and
security-techno eustress) potentially predicts a negative behavioral outcome called
security counterproductive behavior. Challenge techno-stressors are defined as
characteristics of IS that are perceived to provide an opportunity to improve and
strengthen individuals’ skills, tasks, and work-life. On the other hand, hindrance technostressors are referred to as IS characteristics perceived as damaging, interrupting, and
affecting individuals’ work accomplishment and often associated with positive workrelated outcomes (Cavanaugh et al., 2000; LePine et al., 2004; Podsakoff et al., 2007).

Purpose of Study
Previous studies have depicted a negative landscape of security-related
technostress by positing that security-related techno stressors are harmful to employees’
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work performance. Findings suggest negative consequences of security-related stress
toward moral disengagement, neutralization, and decreasing organizational commitment
and organizational security policy compliance (D’Arcy et al., 2014; D’Arcy & Lowry,
2019; D’Arcy & Teh, 2019). However, previous studies suggested a positive relationship
between techno stressors and psychological and behavioral outcomes such as productivity
and performance (Califf et al., 2020; Tarafdar et al., 2010; Tarafdar et al., 2011). Reports
find that many organizational insiders feel responsible for taking precautions against
security threats, yet relatively few employees feel confident in their ability to protect their
firms (Dell, 2017). Recent studies have called for understanding various emotions when
dealing with techno-stressors (Califf et al., 2020; Tarafdar et al., 2017).
Besides, not all stress is detrimental to employees’ well-being. Stressors viewed
as beneficial result in positive stress responses (eustress), while those perceived as
detrimental may result in negative stress responses (distress). Eustress is a form of stress
response to a stressor perceived as beneficial in learning and accomplishing work-related
goals, whereas distress responses negatively affect well-being (Califf et al., 2020; Selye,
1974; Simmons & Nelson, 2007; Tarafdar et al., 2017). There are calls for theoretical
development in the technostress domain by investigating the distress and eustress within
more specific IS contexts (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Califf et al., 2020; Tarafdar et al., 2017).
People assess stressors in the context of their environment. For example, individuals base
their appraisal of stressors on the light of how a particular stressor benefits or harms the
accomplishment of work tasks (Tarafdar et al., 2015; Califf et al., 2020). In this study, it
is argued that information security technology could benefit the organization and
individual employees as they are critical to building and strengthening protection
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mechanisms for organizational digital assets and employees’ data. These information
security technologies got more interwoven with employees’ work-related tasks and
burden employees with extra security demands due to constantly evolving threat
landscapes such as ransomware and phishing spillover from workplace to personal
devices (Li et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2017).
Distress and eustress responses can result from the same stressor, representing
distinct constructs rather than the opposite ends of the same continuum (Edwards &
Cooper, 1988; Nelson & Cooper, 2007). Negative appraisals occur when an individual
anticipates that a stressor represents a threat of future harm or losses. These appraisals
result in distress. In contrast, a positive appraisal, which brings about eustress, occurs
when a person anticipates that some benefit will come because of the stressor. Both
eustress and distress can be brought on by the same stressor (Hargrove et al., 2015). For
example, a promoted worker may simultaneously appraise the promotion (a stressor) as
likely to bring benefits, such as increased prestige, and harm, such as increased strain,
resulting in both eustress and distress. This study defines information security technology
stress response as psychological stress due to bundles of information security technology
employees interact with during their regular work routine. The stresses could include
password managers, antivirus software and customized firewalls, a virtual private
network (VPN), multifactor authentication technology, and cloud security.
Overall, SRS is considered a hindrance stressor, which arises when employees
perceive information security requirements as obstacles to their main job-related tasks
and show negative reactions (D’Arcy et al., 2014; D’Arcy et al., 2018; D’Arcy & Ted,
2019). Security-related stressors are often a negative aspect of organizational information
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security compliance (D’Arcy et al., 2014; D’Arcy et al., 2018; D’Arcy & Teh, 2019; Lee
et al., 2016). However, a broader reading of the organizational stress literature suggests
that techno-stressors could have positive and negative psychological responses (techno
distress and techno eustress) (Califf et al., 2020; Hargrove et al., 2013; Tarafdar et al.,
2017). To design a more effective security program, understanding information security
techno-stressors that provide opportunities to improve and enhance employees’ skills and
tasks is important. While some research efforts address deterring bad end-user behavior
arising from security-related stress, little effort has been made to promote the good stress
end users may have that may lead to information security-related technology behaviors.
Besides, “human as solution” is proposed to improve the design of information security
technology interfaces to enhance usability to align with human needs and limitations
(Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019). This study attempts to incorporate and identify an
empirically testable challenge and hindrance security techno-stressors, their association
with the consequences of security-techno distress and security-techno eustress responses,
namely positive and negative psychological stress responses to security techno-stressors,
which affect the inappropriate security counterproductive behavior.
This study is intended to make both theoretical and practical contributions to the
information security and technostress literature. Job Demands-Resources (JD-R)
(Demerouti et al. 2001) and Technostress-trifecta theoretical framework (Tarafdar et al.,
2017) would make a theoretical contribution to InfoSec and technostress literature that
may broaden the knowledge of stress using the security-related techno stressors. This
study’s theoretical contribution results from integrating the JD-R framework with the
information security technology context. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
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research attempt to examine the two distinct types of information security technostress
sub-processes, namely, security security-techno distress, which results in negative
responses to stressors security-techno eustress, which results in positive responses.
Second, this study examines and explores the differential effects of information security
demands and resources on counterproductive security behavior.
Therefore, this research aims to answer the following research questions:
1. What are the potential consequences of two distinct types of information
security technostress sub-processes on the behavioral outcome, security
counterproductive behavior?
2. Which information security-techno stressors influence security
counterproductive behavior?

Significance of Study
Employees at all levels have to face and deal with the complexity, overload, and
uncertainty of cybersecurity in their jobs every day. Employees might have to deal with
various situations where the organization’s information security compliance goal
interferes with employees’ goal of efficiently completing work tasks, bringing about
stress and negatively affecting security compliance. Little attention has been given to
how stressful demands affect employees’ information security techno-stress responses
(distress and eustress) and security counterproductive behavior. Cram et al. (2019) metaanalysis study suggested that research in security needs to be more specific in terms of
policy compliance due to different factors (i.e., specific information security technology
that may impact on employee’s compliance to protect organizational digital assets) as
previous studies have either studied the broad spectrum compliance with general security
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policies (i.e., a broad, all-encompassing, generic security policy), while others focused on
compliance with a specific type of security policy (i.e., antivirus software, internet use,
data backups).
This study contributes to practice by providing practitioners with a better
understanding of how employees may engage in security counterproductive behaviors.
Also, given the increasing number of employees affected by security stress at work, this
study’s findings may help practitioners understand the consequences of security technodistress and techno-eustress responses, which are negative and positive psychological
responses to security techno stressors. Finally, the study’s findings could advise
organizations to consider and distinguish good security techno-stressors from bad ones
that influence employees’ security counterproductive behavior, foster employees’
commitment, and design programs that track and help employees mitigate the negative
stress response.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, drawing from the InfoSec literature, technostress, and JD-R in the
management and psychology disciplines, the relationship among the study’s constructs
are analyzed by building upon existing work for supporting theorizing and methodology.
Technostress is defined as stress experienced by individuals due to information
technology, which is caused by an inability to cope with new technologies properly
(Brod, 1984). The workplace has been digitally transformed, and employees have become
more reliant on IT to fulfill work-related tasks. Due to dependency on IT, employees
often experience technostress, including overload, complexity, uncertainty, and insecurity
associated with IT (Tarafdar et al., 2007). Person-technology fit was contextualized and
posited that technology features may cause a person-technology gap by either needssupplies or demands-abilities misfits (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Tarafdar et al., 2015). The
literature on IS technostress is abundant with studies that attempt to explain technostress
factors’ influence on negative psychological responses to stressors and organizational
outcomes, including strain, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, withdrawal
(Ayyagari et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2016; Shih et al., 2013; Ragu-Nathan, 2008; Tarafdar et
al., 2007; Tarafdar et al., 2010; Tarafdar et al., 2015; Tams et al., 2018). Technostress
studies have focused on the negative stress response, while positive stress response has
been under-studied (Califf et al., 2020).
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Technostress was adapted to and extended in the context of information security;
nevertheless, the effect of technostress on employee security-related behaviors has been
understudied (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Hwang & Cha, 2018). The literature on behavioral
information security seems to lack consideration of the impact of security technologies on
employees’ security behavior, especially security counterproductive behavior. Previous
studies looked at both technostress and employee ISP violation (D’Arcy et al., 2014;
Hwang & Cha, 2018). For example, users might refuse to comply with ISPs if they find
security tasks stressful due to complexity or uncertainty. Nevertheless, the literature on
behavioral information systems security seems to lack consideration of the impact of IT
on employees’ extra-role activities like ISP compliance.
In this study, the theoretical frameworks of JD-R and Technostress-trifecta were
incorporated to explore and examine the relationship between techno-stressors and two
distinct types of information security technostress sub-processes, namely, security
security-techno distress, which results in negative responses to stressors, and securitytechno eustress, which results in positive responses. Also, JD-R suggests that job
demands and resources initiate and affect exhaustion and organizational and behavioral
outcomes (Bakker et al., 2003; Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). This study focuses on the
behavioral outcome of security counterproductive behavior. It examines the relationship
between two distinct types of information security technostress sub-processes (securitytechno distress and security-techno eustress) and security counterproductive behavior.

12
Theoretical Background
The Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) theoretical framework was originally used to
explain employee burnout; however, it is recently recognized as an appropriate
framework for explaining various facets of job stress (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007). In
this study, the JD-R with Techno-stress trifecta was integrated to develop a research
model and hypotheses on the effects of security techno stressors in employees’ security
behaviors. The model adapted security techno-stressors as job demands. As such, job
demands refer to psychological, social, or organizational factors connected with the job
that require sustained psychological effort and thus are associated with psychological and
physiological costs such as exhaustion and disengagement (Demerouti et al., 2006, Ahuja
et al., 2007). According to JD-R, all job characteristics can be classified as either job
demands or job resources that make the theoretical framework flexible and popular across
diverse disciplines (Bakker & Demerouti, 2014). Job resources are physical, mental,
social, or organizational job characteristics offered to employees to accomplish workrelated tasks and promote growth in learning and practice (Demerouti et al., 2006;
Demerouti & Bakker, 2011). Whereas job demands can evoke psychological or
organizational aspects that hinder organizational outcomes, job resources instigate
motivational processes that positively affect employees’ job performance (Bakker &
Demerouti, 2017). Researchers have successfully applied the model in the information
security context to explore and examine organizational factors that influence employees’
security compliance burnout and security compliance (Pham et al., 2016; Pham et al.,
2019).
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Previous studies focused on examining different aspects of security-related job
stress mainly focused on compliance intention (D’Arcy et al., 2014; D’Arcy & Teh,
2019b; Hwang & Cha, 2018; Pham et al., 2019), yet largely ignore how security
technology may have both negative and positive impacts on employees’ psychological
and behavioral outcomes. Recent studies have called for a better and broader
understanding of the two-sided effects of technology impact on employee’ organizational
outcomes (Califf et al., 2020) and for shifting the dominant perspective from treating
“human-as-error” to treating “human-as-solution” (Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019).
Within the information security context, it may be that “appropriate amounts of stress can
positively affect employees’ work performance” (Tarafdar et al., 2017; Zimmermann &
Renaud, 2019). However, most studies point out the adverse effects of overwhelming
stress on employees (Hwang & Cha, 2018, page 290). It is largely neglected that
protecting organizations by enhancing information security technology might have
unexpected results; ever-changing and complex information security technology and
procedures might leave people inside the organizations in a stressful situation dealing
with overload, information complexity, and uncertainty.
The JD-R model is a stress model that was originally designed to explain the
antecedents of burnout, where job demands and job resources were identified as the
possibility to cause burnout (Demerouti et al., 2001). Essentially, JD-R proposes that
work has two general factors that affect job stress: job demands and resources. Job
demands are the physical, social, or organizational aspects of the job which require
individuals to put physical and psychological effort to deal with them (Bakker et al.,
2003; Demerouti et al., 2001; Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). Examples of job demands
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include role conflict, role ambiguity, job insecurity, time pressure (Armstrong et al.,
2015; Schaufeli & Taris, 2014). In contrast, job resources are defined as physical,
organizational, social, and psychological aspects of the job that are helpful with
individual development and skills learning through work-related tasks accomplishment
and mitigating job demands and their associated psychological cost (Demerouti et al.,
2001). Previous studies include feedback, autonomy, social support, and job resources
(Schaufeli & Taris, 2014; Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). The JD-R theoretical framework
allows this study to examine the stressful demands and the motivational resources aspect
of security-related technology that employees often must get involved in an organization.
The term ‘technostress’ was originally used to describe organizational and
psychological decrements that could be attributed to the sustained efforts required by
employees to remain proficient in changing information and communication technology
(ICT) domains (Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar et al., 2007). However, more recently,
the idea of technology-induced stress has been extended to users of information security
technology (Hwang & Cha, 2018; Hwang & Cha, 2021). Therefore, the technostress
trifecta proposed the holistic IS design principles for technostress that include both
techno-eustress and techno-distress to enhance the positive stress responses and mitigate
the negative effects of technostress through appropriate design based upon different
information technology contexts.
This study integrated the JD-R with the technostress trifecta framework to explain
both the security techno-stressors and the psychological positive and negative stress
responses (distress and eustress) eustress, which is defined as a positive response to a
stressor that is perceived as beneficial in achieving goals and improving well-being.
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While distress as stress that creates a threat or hindrance may serve as the guiding point
to see which security-related stress may be perceived as eustress and distress, it will
eventually impact employees’ security inappropriate counterproductive behavior.

Security-Related Hindrance Techno-Stressors
Factors that induce stress are called stressors, and technology-related stressors are
known as technostress creators or techno stressors (Tarafdar et al., 2010; Ragu-Nathan et
al., 2008). Techno stressors were used in different contexts to understand which aspects
of information technology affect employees’ psychological and behavioral outcomes
(Ayyagari et al., 2011; Galluch et al. 2015; Ragu-Nathan, 2008; Shih et al., 2013;
Tarafdar et al., 2007; Tarafdar et al., 2010; Tarafdar et al., 2015; Tams et al., 2018).
Security-related stress (SRS) describes the stressful demands imposed explicitly
by security policy requirements (D’Arcy et al., 2014). SRS is a form of psychological
stress caused by internal or external security-related demands appraised as taxing one’s
cognitive resources or abilities incurred by security policy and procedures (D’Arcy et al.,
2014). Even though the term SRS was adopted and developed from technostress
literature, it was not explicitly examined in the stress-induced state of information
security technology. There are three factors used: SRS-Overload, SRS-Complexity, SRSUncertainty.
Security-related technostress creators are defined as the degree of overload,
complexity, and uncertainty of information security technology that cause employees
psychological stress (Hwang & Cha, 2018). The reasons are that security technology is
often complex, and systems adopted as security measures to improve information security
often add challenges and demands on the employees, which often hinder their tasks
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fulfillment and affect information security practice. Concerns arise that security
technology stimulates employees’ negative stress responses, as examined in this study.
Adding new information security technology may hinder employees from achieving their
work-related goals (Hwang & Cha, 2018). They may perceive security as not their
primary work goal, creating additional work or conflict with their task fulfillment. The
unique difference between SRS and the security technostress is that SRS contains
security policies and procedures while the security technology aspect was largely
ignored. Arguably, it is crucial to identify technology characteristics that are important to
the context of information security technology. The reason is that the frequent interaction
between users and security technology is critical to the design of information security
management that improves value alignment for all parties involved as people,
technology, and process are all needed to adequately secure a system (Merkow &
Breihaupt, 2014).
Therefore, it is essential to identify technology characteristics that are important
to the context of information security technology and stress. Moreover, there is a call to
examine further characteristics of technostress related to information security technology
to understand their unique impact on employees (Hwang & Cha, 2018). In this study,
security technostress creators’ rationale was adapted as security-related hindrance technostressors. The following paragraphs explain the unique difference between three factors
from security-related stress and security technostress.
SRS-overload is defined as situations where security requirements increase
employees’ workload, leading to added time pressure to complete job duties (D’Arcy et
al., 2014). Examples of SRS-overload were given in situations where security policy and
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procedures’ requirements increase the workload for employees and create added time
pressure to meet these security requirements. That wastes employees’ time on valuable
tasks as they must follow the policy and procedures while trying to accomplish their
work-related tasks. For example, there are many government regulations and industry
standards (e.g., Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) and SarbanesOxley Act Section 404 (SOX 404)) that require organizations to follow certain
procedures strictly.
On the other hand, security techno-overload refers to increased workload due to
required information security technology. For example, in order to protect documents,
employees may be required to get permission from the IT department before they
exchange documents with clients and external partners or wait for IT staff to install
software or download needed materials or automated employee’ work task disruption due
to virus scan or patch update. The increased use of information technology such as
multifactor authentication (MFA) or a secure file transfer appliance requires employees
to significantly change their work practices and habits, thereby contributing to greater
stress.
SRS-Complexity refers to situations where security requirements are viewed as
problematic and force employees to spend more time and effort learning and
understanding security policies and procedures within the organization (D’Arcy et al.,
2014). Examples are complex contingencies or technical jargon within security policies
that inhibit employees’ job task resources and increase stress.
More specifically focused on security technology, security techno-complexity is
another factor related to circumstances in which the level of security technology required
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is complex, such as frequent change or sudden updates. Security techno-complexity
refers to the degree of complexity of information security technology, an inherent quality
of information security technology that makes employees feel confused and incompetent.
The information security technology requirement is modified to suit such a change; for
instance, they find it difficult to determine when encryption is required. Organizations
often require employees to spend extra time and effort to understand complex security
technology terms, concepts and follow standardized processes and methodologies
regardless of their work duties.
SRS-uncertainty refers to events that force organizations to continuously add and
update security policies requirements (D’Arcy et al., 2014). Examples of internal and
government or industry regulations law require new encryption rules for transmitting data
and authentication procedures for accessing corporate systems. Also, the organization’s
updated security policy requires employees to adjust to new requirements, which are
stress-inducing.
More specially focused on security technology, the security techno-uncertainty
refers to the degree of change in employees’ work due to constant upgrades in
information security technology. For example, frequent information security technology
changes and upgrades unsettle users and create uncertainty that they must constantly
learn and educate themselves about new information security technology. Organizations
often require employees to change their behaviors to counteract the external threat
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environment; hence, employees are often hesitant to accept an organizations’
requirements because of the uncertainty of security technology change.

Security-Related Challenge Techno-Stressors
Challenge stressors could be related to positive work outcomes; these stressors are
perceived as beneficial and helpful to learn and accomplish work-related tasks
(Cavanaugh et al., 2000; Podsakoff et al., 2007; Hargrove et al., 2013). When an
individual appraises the stressor as beneficial to job tasks, the stressor is a challenge
stressor; in contrast, if the stressor is perceived as hindering the job tasks, the stressor is a
hindrance stressor (Hargrove et al., 2013).
There are calls and raising recognition that positive stress may exist in the
technology context (Tarafdar et al., 2017). Recently, Califf et al. (2020) conceptualized a
holistic technostress process that includes positive and negative components of
technostress embedded in two sub-processes: the techno-eustress sub-process and the
techno-distress sub-process within the context of healthcare information technology. The
technostress literature suggests two distinct types of stressors: challenge and hindrance
(Tarafdar et al., 2017; Califf et al., 2020). These factors are important to improve the
technology characteristics and the challenge perceived by employees (Tarafdar et al.,
2017). The InfoSec literature has not yet empirically identified or investigated challenge
techno-stressors and their effects; therefore, in this study, it is argued that these security
challenge stressors are vital and supplemented to help employees improve their security
practice and strengthen the organization’s digital asset protection.
When information security job resources are sufficient, organizations tend to
increase their capabilities to prevent cyber threats from happening. The InfoSec literature
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also has suggested emphasizing security resources available to promote and enable
information security compliance and protection (Thomson & von Solms, 1998; Siponen,
2000; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Previous studies called for
diversifying the field’s understanding of facilitation resources in information security,
considering both technological and organizational resources (Cavusoglu et al., 2005;
D’Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Puhakainen & Siponen 2010). The security
technologies were proposed as socio-technical systems, which are essentially what cyber
systems built, and made up of multiple interconnected components, including technology
itself, processes, and human actors (Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019). Therefore, applying
the same rationale for this study, security-related techno-reliability, security technical
support, SETA availability, SETA effectiveness, and security knowledge sharing
challenge stressors were included as security job resources since these resources are
beneficial and challenging for employees to strengthen their security knowledge and
security hygiene practice. The paragraphs below explain why these factors are treated as
challenge stressors.
When individuals admit that they are vulnerable to IT security threats, they are
likely to use information security technology perceived as useful. A previous
experimental study of endpoint web-based security software’s findings suggested that
users may not perceive security software directly supporting work activities. Therefore,
performance security benefits may not be explicitly recognized, encouraging further
research in information security technology adoption (Shropshire et al., 2015). Moreover,
the security threat is perceived to be severe and avoidable. An individual will be more
likely to adopt IT security solutions to address the threats by evaluating the capabilities of
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such technology and form a disposition toward it (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010). Various security-related technostress characteristics with an
appropriate amount of stress may positively affect employees’ work performance, which
leads to a need for recommended further study to strengthen understanding of the unique
impact of security-related techno stressors (Hwang & Cha, 2018, page 290).
Security Education Training Awareness (SETA) Availability is regarded as one of
the most important explicit methodologies that guide employees to achieve security goals
in the workplace (Zakaria, 2006). SETA programs were found to positively influence
perceived certainty and punishment severity (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Zakaria, 2006). Studies
suggested organizations should consider having a budget for SETA efforts to motivate
employees to strengthen information security policy compliance intention and weaken
information systems misuse intention (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009b;
Whitman et al., 2001). SETA contains security policy education and training and covers
several security technology instruction guidelines. For example, employees are
sometimes required to use VPN when off-site work and the need for MFA should be a
part of the SETA program. These are important and continuously updated as new
technology and associated security issues emerge. Training needs will shift and update
employees with new skills and capabilities necessary to respond to technology changes
and update and foster good security practices within organizations.
Standards bodies, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), industry, and scholars emphasized the vitality of effective security training and
awareness programs (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014; Cisco, 2018;
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Siponen, 2000; Thomson & van Niekerk, 2012; Yoo et al., 2018).
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Security Education Training Awareness (SETA) Effectiveness refers to security training
as an important resource that positively promotes employees’ security efficacy (D’Arcy
et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009b). When employees perceive SETA as effective, they
believe they have the necessary knowledge and skills to handle security issues in the
organization. People trained effectively are better equipped with knowledge and skills on
security guidelines and security technology (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009b).
Hence, SETA effectiveness is included in this study and argued that the more effective
the SETA program is, the more engaging the employees will become and the more
beneficial they feel about it.
Technology reliability is a way to maintain user engagement and increase
individual confidence when using technology, thereby creating a positive user experience
(Ayyagari et al., 2011; Califf et al., 2020). Security techno-reliability is the extent of the
dependability and consistency of a security-related system, which is recognized as a
factor in IS success models (DeLone & McLean, 1992; DeLone & McLean, 2003; Jiang
et al., 2002). However, present-day investment in information security technology is
influenced by normative pressure from the dominant players and partners that
organizations must follow and invest in without adequately considering its reliability
(Cavusoglu et al., 2015). Zimmermann and Renaud’s (2019) “Cybersecurity, Differently”
suggests that human actors with minimal security expertise should be recognized as task
experts. These are those who can best describe their tasks, specific goals, the processes
they engage in, and identify the factors that influence constraints.
When new information security technologies are implemented, IT professionals
should encourage users to explore and provide help desk and technical support to resolve
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end-user problems. Security technical support has been found positively significant in
strengthening employees’ self-efficacy in various technology contexts (Herath & Rao,
2009b; Siponen, 2000). Previous studies suggested that technical support also helps
reduce the negative aspects of technostress (Sykes, 2015; Califf et al., 2020; RaguNathan et al., 2008). Technical support was suggested to reduce regular workload during
critical systems implementation and give employees time to learn and use (Brod, 1984;
Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008). Hence, it is argued that security technical support can
positively impact employees’ positive psychological response to techno-stressors.
Information security knowledge is often embedded not solely in the documents or
repositories but also organizational processes and practices. The basic security
knowledge can be treated as organizational members able to perform, lean, and teach
security tasks in terms of protection and reflection procedures on information security
matters. Zakaria (2006) emphasized the importance of changing tacit knowledge to
explicit knowledge in terms of knowledge creation, especially on security knowledge
amongst employees in organizations. The emphasis is necessary because security
knowledge must be externalized to share and learn from others’ security practices,
eventually encouraging each employee to perform, learn and teach security tasks
effectively and efficiently (Safa & Von Solms, 2016). For example, colleagues who have
better knowledge and experience with security technology would share the knowledge
and experience with the less experienced colleagues about utilizing the MFA and VPN
features or strengthening the email threat protection through email security features.
Furthermore, Zimmermann and Renaud (2019) proposed the mindset manifests that
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encourage employees as human-as-solution by increasing security awareness and
knowledge as an essential part of information security solutions.

Distress and Eustress
Stress is a complex two-sided phenomenon, and individuals can appraise
environmental conditions as both threatening and challenging, and the respective
outcomes can be damaging and beneficial, respectively (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). For
example, implementing a new system can be appraised as a threat or as an opportunity,
upon which different kinds of adaptation behaviors are engaged, leading to different
kinds of outcomes (Beaudry & Pinsonneault, 2010; Cooper et al., 2001). A negative
stress response (detrimental stress) is a particular relationship between the person and the
environment that the person appraises as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and
endangering his or her well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The stress response is an
evaluative process that determines why and to what extent a particular transaction or
series of transactions between the person and the environment is stressful. (Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984). Cognitive appraisal is an evaluative process that determines why and to
what extent a particular transaction or series of transactions between the person and the
environment is stressful. Previous research discussed the importance of psychological
stress responses to investigate stress research (Califf et al., 2020; Cooper et al., 2001;
Lazarus, 1995; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984); therefore, exploring the stressors-stress
response-outcome process in the information security technology context would increase
our knowledge and understanding of the transaction between the individual and the
environment.
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Techno distress is a sub-process in which individuals appraise security techno
stressors as unfavorable or hindrance to their job goal attainment and well-being
(Tarafdar et al., 2017). The security techno-distress could hinder employees’ work
progress. They may perceive security tech as lowering their productivity as security often
makes employees feel anxiety, frustration, and anger when security techno-stressors are
in place (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2014). An example of security techno distress
is that employees must get permission from the security department before exchanging
documents with colleagues and external partners. Moreover, constant upgrades in
information security technology make employees feel anxious since organizations
constantly try to change their security tech to better suit the requirements of newer
security tech environments, imposing stress on employees. Therefore, information
security techno-distress is perceived as technology-related stress created or caused using
information security technology.
Information security technology provides individual employees and consumer
protection of important information assets using data encryption, firewalls, cloud
computing, antivirus, anti-spyware software, and access control software. Previous study
findings suggested that technical security demands more security resources from
employees than managerial security since it directly controls employees during their
overall work processes through technical security systems (Lee et al., 2016). Managerial
security emphasizes strengthening employees’ security awareness, knowledge, and
behavioral information security measures, while technical security focuses on
information security applications. Information security technology creates “bad” stress by
posing an obstacle to task fulfillment, being a resource constraint, eliciting role or task
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ambiguity, and producing role or task conflicts that all may inhibit individual learning or
personal growth (Tarafdar et al., 2015; Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008).
Although psychology and organizational behavior differentiate between negative
(distress) and positive stress responses (eustress), InfoSec literature primarily focuses on
the negative aspects of technology-induced negative stress (D’Arcy & Teh, 2019; Hwang
& Cha, 2018; Kim et al., 2016). Stressors are inherently neutral; whether they lead to a
positive or negative stress response relies on an individual’s cognitive appraisal and how
the situation will affect well-being. Based on the JD-R model, demand from technology
characteristics may create a misfit between demands and individual values, while
resources such as SETA training and security technical support may buffer the negative
effect (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007; Bakker & Demerouti, 2017).
Eustress is referred to as stress that creates an opportunity. It builds a positive
appraisal of demands in the environment to promote personal growth and promotion.
Cavanaugh et al. (2000) differentiate between challenge and hindrance stressors; their
findings suggested that challenge stressors can lead to a beneficial view of stress, called
eustress. This beneficial stress is called eustress (Selye, 1974). It represents a positive
appraisal of demands based on the potential for the demands to result in personal benefits
(Simmons & Nelson, 2001). More technology-focused, security techno-eustress explains
how individuals appraise information technologies as challenging or thrilling (Tarafdar et
al., 2017; Tarafdar et al., 2010). Similar logic can be applied to information security
technology as employees may perceive security technology as interesting and motivating
to practice their security hygiene. For instance, companies may strengthen employees’
understanding of information security technology through their security education
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training program and encourage them to watch or attend information security technology
training with the IT department.
Techno-eustress has been defined as “the phenomenon that embodies the positive
stress that individuals face in their use of IS” and occurs when “individuals appraise IS as
challenging or thrilling” (Tarafdar et al., 2017, pg. 14). Eustress may suggest end-users
think they have control over the information security technology. A sense of being in a
challenging position helps them feel secure and stabilizes their emotional state. For
instance, an online banking user who frequently changes passwords updates antivirus and
anti-spyware software, and installs security patches for his/her operating systems will
have a positive emotion and not feel distressed by losing identity in online transactions.
Alternatively, an employee in the education industry is required to install an employersupplied VPN at home, s/he may perceive VPN as helping to protect the organizational
data assets, and s/he could feel excited to install VPN to secure his data on his/her
computers at home. With confidence and encouragement, users will be more motivated to
take security actions to counter the security stress. A previous study developed a webbased security tool to assess PCs’ susceptibility to attacks from third parties and reported
results to end-users via PHP-generated webpage content, helping end-users stay vigilance
(Shropshire et al., 2015). Security software benefits often go mostly unnoticed.
In this study, security techno-eustress is defined as the phenomenon associated
with a positive stress response that individuals experience while using information
security technology (Tarafdar et al., 2017). Individuals may perceive information security
technologies as beneficial to learn new skills and strengthen individual security
awareness. Individuals may perceive information security technologies functionality as
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an opportunity for innovative use to evaluate security characteristics such as reliability as
opportunities to experiment and use to enhance their information security good practice
behavior. For example, employees may stop using USB thumb-drive to back up data and
gradually adopt cloud-based security to protect their digital assets. Furthermore,
employees may utilize features (i.e., secured file storage, encryption protocols, sites
breach alerts) on a password manager to adhere to the organization’s stringent password
policy instead of writing passwords down on the sticky note.

Security Counterproductive Behavior
Counterproductive behavior is defined as a set of distinct acts that share the
characteristics of negative and harmful to organizations and organization stakeholders
(Spector & Fox, 2005). Although counterproductive behavior is intended to have a
detrimental effect on organizations and individuals, it was conceptualized in various
ways, including organization aggression (Neuman & Baron, 1998; Fox & Spector, 1999),
deviance (Hollinger, 1986; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Counterproductive behaviors
were associated with a general disregard for organizational safety and policies (Spector et
al., 2006; Spector & Fox, 2010). In addition, these volitional behaviors are associated
with actions that may be deemed accidental or directly mandated as a behavioral
manifestation of job stress (Fox et al., 201l; Spector & Fox, 2005). These
counterproductive behaviors were operationalized as the multidimensional construct to
capture and explain more specific negative behaviors within the workplace, including
sabotage, withdrawal, production deviance, theft, and abuse (Spector et al., 2006).
InfoSec literature proposed two distinct instruments of information security
deviant behaviors, including resource misuse and security carelessness (Chu & Chau,
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2014). Information security deviant behavior is defined as the voluntary behavior of
employees within organizations that differ markedly from the organizations’ information
security norms and that other employees normally consider to be wrong (Chu & Chau,
2014). While security carelessness refers to the behavior of not giving sufficient thought
or attention to individual actions in using or handling IS resources. In contrast, resource
misuse refers to behaviors relating to inappropriate or improper use of IS resources in
employees’ daily work activities.
Recently, a study attempted to develop another third behavior used to explain and
assess employees’ non-malicious information security behavior, called security
procrastination (Ifinedo, 2019). Security procrastination refers to employees
procrastinating in carrying out required IS actions. It is a behavior of putting off or
delaying IS activities requiring immediate attention. The reasoning suggests that when
employees postpone responsibilities, decisions, and duties in updating IS security tasks
may lead to security-related problems for their organizations.
In this study, counterproductive security behavior is defined as abnormal
behaviors by employees who do not follow the organization’s information security
norms, yet without bad intention to damage the organization’s digital assets. Also, an
individual’s behavior in organizations was suggested to be influenced by stress; therefore,
it is arguable that these counterproductive security behaviors can be caused by job
stressors (Chen & Spector, 1992; Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2012). Table 2.1 contains
the definitions of all constructs used in the study.
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Table 2.1
Definitions and Constructs Used in Study
Construct
Security technooverload
Security technocomplexity

Security technouncertainty
SETA
Availability

SETA
Effectiveness
Security technoreliability
Security technical
support

Knowledge
Sharing

Operational Definitions
The degree of increase in the amount of
workload due to required information security
technology.
The degree of complexity of information
security technology, associated with
information security technology that makes
employees feel incompetent.
The degree of constant upgrades in information
security technology that affect individual workrelated tasks.
The degree of deterrent effect that could be
achieved through ongoing security briefings or
courses that reinforce acceptable usage
guideline and emphasize potential consequences
for misuse.
The extent to which employees attending the
SETA programs feel that they achieve the goal
of SETA effectively
The extend of dependability and consistency of
the information security technology’s features
The extent of support activities to end-users and
responsiveness addressing information securityrelated problems from IT help desk.

The extent of knowledge sharing about
information security technology within
organization to increase awareness and mitigate
the risk of information security incidents.
Security TechnoThe perception of negative stress response
Distress
toward information security techno stressors
that affect individual’s well-being and goal
accomplishment.
Security TechnoThe perception of positive stress response
Eustress
toward information security techno stressors
that benefit individual’s learning and personal
growth.
Security
The abnormal behaviors engaged in by
Counterproductive employees who do not follow the organization’s
behavior
information security norms, yet without bad
intention to damage the organization’s digital
assets

Reference
Hwang and
Cha, 2018
Hwang and
Cha, 2018

Hwang and
Cha, 2018
D’Arcy et al.,
2009

Yoo et al.,
2018
Ayyagari et
al., 2011
Liang and
Xue, 2010;
Tarafdar et al.,
2014
Extended and
adapted from
Ragu-Nathan,
2008
O’Sullivan,
2011

Selye, 1974;
Tarafdar et al.,
2017
Chu and Chau,
2014; Ifinedo,
2019
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Research Model and Hypotheses
In this section, the JD-R integrated with the technostress trifecta frameworks is
discussed to develop hypotheses for this study. Job demands refer to “physical, social, or
organizational aspects of the job that require sustained physical or mental effort and are
therefore associated with certain psychological costs” such as exhaustion (Demerouti et
al., 2001, page 501). Job demands are positively related to exhaustion (Bakker &
Demerouti, 2007; Crawford et al., 2010). Hindrance stressors are considered constraints
or barriers since they affect individuals’ job-related task accomplishment and personal
growth (Cavanaugh et al., 200l; Podsakoff et al., 2007; Demerouti & Bakker, 2011).
Examples of hindrance stressors are role ambiguity, organizational politics, interpersonal
conflict, and role conflict (Cavanaugh et al., 2001; Demerouti & Bakker, 2011; LePine et
al., 2004). These stressors are considered as ‘bad’ demands (Demerouti & Bakker, 2011)
and associated positively with negative psychological and organizational outcomes,
including turnover intention, absenteeism, tardiness, work performance, job satisfaction,
and organizational commitment (LePine et al., 2004; LePine et al., 2005; Podsakoff et al.,
2007). JD-R theory guides understanding the effects of information security technology
demands taxing on employees. The effects of security demands exhibit themselves in
physical, social, and organizational aspects that affect employees’ work performance and
well-being.
The JD-R framework is characterized by its flexibility in operationalizing all job
demands and resources specific to a certain context and environment (Pham et al., 2016;
LePine et al., 2005; Demerouti & Bakker, 2001; Schaufeli, 2017). Furthermore, job
demands were operationalized as a second-order construct containing first-order
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constructs, such as workload, complexity, time pressure, administrative stressors
(Crawford et al., 2010; Demerouti & Bakker, 2001; Schaufeli, 2017; Wolter et al., 2018).
In the InfoSec literature, previous studies show that security-related stressors
(uncertainty, complexity, and overload) have a positive relationship with negative
psychological stress responses, employees’ emotions of frustration and fatigue, which
consequentially increase neutralization, noncompliance intention, and decrease
compliance behavior (D’Arcy et al., 2014; D’Arcy et al., 2018; D’Arcy & Teh, 2019;
Zhen et al., 2021). Moreover, qualitative findings found that employees have been
stressed with complex security requirements, with slim opportunities to develop a handson experience or adapt security into their work routines (Posey et al., 2014). In this study,
the security job demands, namely, hindrance security techno-stressors, include security
techno-overload, security techno-uncertainty, and security techno-complexity. These
have been associated with negative psychological stress responses due to information
security technology getting more complex and specialized, making employees’ working
environment susceptible to technostress and resultant role stress that affect overwhelming
stress on employees (D’Arcy & Teh, 2019; Hwang & Cha, 2018). The information
security technologies’ demands occur on top of employees’ work-related tasks. For
instance, employees are often required to change passwords and recall complex
passwords for various accounts or create email encryption with external stakeholders
while dealing with urgent requests from clients. The imposition of information security
technologies causes employees to be overwhelmed and are perceived as laborious
(D’Arcy et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2011; Posey et al., 2014; Puhakainen et al., 2010; Wall,
2011). Moreover, security technologies uncertainty occurs when employees may not
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know what to do or whom to ask for help. Technical security requirements (i.e., email
encryption) or infinite technology upgrades hinder employees from developing an
experiential basis and constantly refreshing their knowledge. Hence, employees face
high-security standards and diverse security technology. The convenience of employees’
daily work is inevitably affected, resulting in negative stress responses regarding the
organization’s security technology guidelines.
The overarching stress process contains two sub-processes associated with the
positive and negative stress responses, namely eustress and distress, depending on
whether the stressor is perceived as beneficial or harmful. (Califf et al., 2020; Hargrove et
al., 2015; Simmons & Nelson, 2007; Sommer et al., 2016). Hindrance stressors are
negatively associated with negative emotional stress responses and detrimental
psychological and behavioral outcomes. They stimulate negative emotions because of
negative appraisal hindering personal growth and goal attainment. At the same time, they
have a negative relationship with positive attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, including
engagement, attentiveness, and organizational citizenship behavior (Crawford et al.,
2010; Rodell & Judge, 2009). Therefore, in this study, security technology hindrance
stressors, namely security job demands, was argued to be positively associated with
negative stress response and represent a threat because they are viewed as deterrents to
achieving positive outcomes. Therefore, I hypothesized as follow:
H1a: Security job demands is positively associated with security techno-distress
H1b: Security job demands is negatively associated with security techno-eustress
JD-R focuses on two job-related factors that predict employee response, including
demands and resources (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007), assuming that when an individual
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has sufficient helpful resources to rely on, it will reduce their experience with distress.
Job resources are physical, psychological, social, or organizational aspects of the job that
are perceived as instrumental to personal development, achieving work goals (Demerouti
et al., 2001). Also, the presence of these resources should serve to reduce distress by
allowing workers to complete tasks without seeking additional resources. According to
the JD-R framework, job resources were operationalized as a second-order construct that
contains various first-order factors, including role clarity, supervisor support, job
security, team effectiveness (Crawford et al., 2010; Demerouti & Bakker, 2001;
Schaufeli, 2017; Wolter et al., 2018). In addition, job resources should increase eustress
by providing the resources employees need to pursue their jobs’ vital aspects (Schaufeli
& Bakker, 2004). Furthermore, challenge stressors promote personal growth and
achievement, often perceived as beneficial (Cavanaugh et al., 200l; Podsakoff et al.,
2007; Demerouti & Bakker, 2011). Examples of challenging stressors were workload,
responsibility (Cavanaugh et al., 2001; Demerouti & Bakker, 2011; LePine et al., 2005).
In IS, the challenge techno-stressors were usefulness, technical support, and involvement
facilitation (Califf et al., 2020). These challenge stressors are considered good resources
and associated positively with job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job
performance (Califf et al., 2020; Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar et al., 2010).
Reliability is one of the major IS characteristics recognized in the IS success
model (Delone & McLean, 1992; Jiang et al., 2002; Tarafdar et al., 2017). Technology
reliability is a way to maintain user engagement and increase individual confidence when
using technology, thereby creating a positive user experience (Ayyagari et al., 2011;
Califf et al., 2020). Therefore, it is argued that security techno reliability is one of the
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critical characteristics of an indispensable resource. Moreover, previous studies examined
and suggested that technical support can inhibit detrimental stress and help to reduce the
negative techno stressors (Syke, 2015; Califf et al., 2020; Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008).
When new information security technology is implemented, IT professionals should
encourage users to explore and provide help desk and security technical support to
resolve end-user problems. Technical support was suggested to reduce regular workload
during critical systems implementation and give employees time to learn and use (Brod,
1984; Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008). In addition, security education and training (SETA) are
one of the essential resources that firms need to have in place to strengthen appropriate IS
usage and educate employees on potential consequences of misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009;
Herath & Rao, 2009; Hwang et al., 2019; Whitman et al., 2001). SETA Availability is the
degree of achievable deterrent effect through ongoing security briefings or courses that
reinforce acceptable usage guidelines and emphasize potential misuse consequences
(D’Arcy et al., 2009; Zakaria, 2006). However, SETA cannot be “one size fits all” due to
not taking into account individual motivations and appraisals, especially in the rapidly
changing information security technology because cyber attackers are determined to
make novel attack techniques (Zimmermann & Renaud, 2019). Organizations need to
provide effective security training that supports and strengthens security awareness and
improves employees’ security compliance (Yoo et al., 2018). As a result, SETA
effectiveness is defined as employees’ feeling from training that they achieve the goal of
SETA effectively. Knowledge sharing is an important growth factor within the current
organizational environment (Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008). Due to the ever-increasing
sophistication of information security technology and cyber threats, security knowledge
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sharing is needed to raise awareness and know-how to avoid cyber threats and mitigate
their risks. Also, it is important to involve employees across all departments to participate
in the information security technology design to help understand their needs (Califf et al.,
2020; Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Tarafdar et al., 2010; Zakaria, 2006).
Organizations provide adequate information systems resources and guidelines to
help employees reduce burnout and strengthen their information security best practice
(D’Arcy et al., 2009; Pham et al., 2016; Pham et al., 2019). Job resources have been
positively related to work motivation, organizational commitment, and engagement
(Bakker et al., 2003). Applying a similar rationale, it is argued that when security job
resources are provided, that should strengthen employees’ positive psychological
response and weaken their negative psychological response. Therefore, the following
hypotheses are formed.
H2a: Security job resources (challenge stressors) is negatively associated with
security techno-distress
H2b: Security job resources (challenge stressors) is positively associated with
security techno-eustress
Counterproductive behavior has been operationalized as a multi-dimensional
construct with a second-order construct to capture and explain more specific behaviors
within the workplace, including sabotage, withdrawal, production deviance, theft, and
abuse (Spector et al., 2006). In this study, counterproductive security behavior that
comprises behavioral manifestations is operationalized with three unique instruments:
resource misuse, security procrastination, and security carelessness developed and
validated (Chu & Chau, 2014; Ifinedo, 2019). Previous information security studies
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suggested that positive and negative psychological responses may influence cybersecurity
workers on their level of readiness and responsiveness against cyber threats (Helkala,
2016). In contrast, cybersecurity workers may have a positive psychological response if
adequate security resources are offered (Helkala, 2016; Lundgren & Bergstrom, 2019).
Following (Califf et al., 2020; Tarafdar et al., 2017) propositions on designing IS to aid in
challenge and threat coping responses and designing IS to enhance positive outcomes and
diminish adverse effects.
Strain is defined as the behavioral, psychological, and physiological outcomes of
stress observed in individuals (Cooper et al., 2001). Techno stressors are associated with
negative psychological and behavioral strains (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2001;
Tarafdar et al., 2010). Psychological strains are emotional reactions to stressor conditions
and include, among others, dissatisfaction with the job, depression, and negative selfevaluation. Strain is the outcome of stress and results from distress and is adverse
consequences emerging from a direct relationship with various techno stressors (Tarafdar
et al., 2015; Tarafdar et al., 2017). Simultaneously, behavioral outcomes included
reduced productivity, increased turnover and absenteeism, and poor performance (Cooper
et al., 2001; Tarafdar et al., 2007). Furthermore, there is an adverse effect of ICT techno
stressors on users’ job satisfaction and performance (Ragu-Nathan et al., 2008; Tarafdar
et al., 2010). Therefore, it is argued that the behavioral strain, namely security
counterproductive behavior, is the adverse outcome from the security technology’s
psychological responses (Figure 2.1).
Hence, in this study, the following hypotheses were formed:

38
H3: Security techno-distress is positively associated with security
counterproductive behaviors
H4: Security techno-eustress is negatively associated with security
counterproductive behaviors

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
General Approach
A quantitative survey using a survey panel design was conducted. Scale
measurements that reflect the constructs discussed in Chapter 2 were adapted and
extended from previous studies. The partial least squares (PLS) methodology was applied
to empirically test the model (Chin, 1998; Hair et al. 2014)
The university human use committee approved the study. Target subjects were
adult employed individuals who use information technology in their daily work activities.
Appropriate respondents were asked two screening questions designed to check whether
they use information technology to perform their work and whether they are aware of
information security technology in place in their organization (see Appendix B).
Participants who were qualified were allowed to complete the survey using Qualtrics
web-based survey software.
Participants were required to live in the United States to control for cultural biases
in our sample. Incomplete data sets and low survey completion times were controlled to
guarantee high data quality further. Besides, the survey included quality control questions
and poor data from respondents who failed to pay attention or gave nonsense answers to
open-ended questions were eliminated. A cross-sectional correlational design was
adopted to understand the relationship between the predictors and outcome variables.
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There are several reasons why online panels are appropriate for distributing the
survey to the target population sample. First, online panels allow data collection from a
large population of respondents (Steelman et al., 2015). Second, online research panels
provide respondents with different backgrounds and experiences. Third, the screening
options allow us to approach respondents who properly fit our research (Lowry et al.,
2016). Finally, online panels provide built-in anonymity and feature to ensure data
quality (Rouse, 2015). Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used in this study.
MTurk is a unique source of online panel data to access to employees at diverse
organizations, which is no longer an exception in scientific research (Owens & Hawkins,
2019). MTurk provides higher generalizability on the pilot and exploratory studies and
has greater potential for cross-validation and generalization testing of data because data
collected via Mechanical Turk are recommended with externally and internally valid
(Berinsky et al., 2012; Lowry et al., 2016). In addition, rigorous criteria were set to
increase the data quality; criteria settings were placed that only accepted MTurk users to
participate in the study if and only if they had more than 5,000 Human Intelligence Tasks
(HIT) approved, 98% HIT approval rate. They were located in the United States.

Measures
We adapted existing validated well-tested measurement items in the extant
literature. The first-order measures, including security techno-overload, security technouncertainty, and security techno-complexity, are from (Hwang & Cha, 2018). The
measurement of SETA effectiveness was adopted from Yoo et al. (2018), SETA
availability was adopted from D’Arcy et al. (2009); Sarkar et al. (2020), security
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techno-reliability from Ayyagari et al. (2011), security technical support from Liang and
Xue (2010) and Tarafdar et al. (2014), and security knowledge sharing was selfdeveloped in this study. Security technology negative psychological response (security
techno-distress) was taken and adapted from Cohen et al. (1983), Watson et al. (1988),
and Xu et al. (2019), while security technology positive psychological response (security
techno-eustress) was adapted from O’Sullivan (2011) and Watson et al. (1988). Security
counterproductive behaviors, including security carelessness, security procrastination,
and information systems resource misuse, were adapted and extended (Chu & Chau,
2014; Ifinedo, 2019). A 7-point Likert response scale, using anchor text for all seven
levels, was used for overload, uncertainty, complexity, SETA effectiveness, SETA
availability, security techno-reliability, security technical support, and knowledge sharing
(1-strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree). A 7-point Likert response scale, using anchor
text for all seven levels, was used for distress and eustress (1-Never to 7-Always) and
was used for security carelessness, resource misuse, and security procrastination. A bipolar 7-points scale was used for a control variable, self-efficacy (Very difficult to very
easy). Table 3.1 contains the constructs’ measurement items and sources.
Job demands were conceptualized as a formative second-order latent variable
consisting of security techno-overload, techno-uncertainty, and techno-complexity.
Similarly, job resources were treated as a formative second-order latent variable
composed of SETA availability, SETA effectiveness, security techno-reliability,
technical support, and knowledge sharing. Behavioral outcomes were conceptualized as a
formative second-order latent variable comprised of security carelessness, resource
misuse, and security procrastination.
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In addition, this study attempted to uncover the control variables recommended by
(Hwang & Cha, 2018; Tarafdar et al., 2011; Tarafdar et al., 2017). Control variables
consisted of gender, age, education, year of work experience, security self-efficacy,
educational level, occupation, organizational tenure, and job role (IT and non-IT).

Table 3.1
Constructs, Adapted Items, and Sources
Items
STO1
STO2
STO3
STO4
STO5

STU1
STU2
STU3

Construct
Security techno-overload
I am forced by my organization’s information security
technology to work much faster in order to complete my
work.
I am forced by information security technology to do more
work than I can handle.
I am forced by information security technology to work with
very tight schedules.
I take too much care of my data protection on information
security technology.
Because of my organization’s information security
technology, I have to work faster to complete my work on
time.
Security techno-uncertainty
There are always new developments in the information
security technology we use in our organization.
There are frequent upgrades to the information security
technology in my organization.
There are always new information security technology
requirements in my job.

Reference
Hwang and
Cha (2018)

(Hwang and
Cha 2018)
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Items

STC1
STC2
STC3
STR1
STR2
STR3

TS1
TS2
TS3
TS4

SETA1
SETA2
SETA3
SETA4
SETA5

Construct

Reference

Security techno-complexity
I need a long time to understand and use new information
security technology
I do not find enough time to upgrade my information
security technology skills.
I often find it too complex to understand and use new
information security technology
Security techno-reliability
(Ayyagari et
The features provided by my organization’s information
al. 2011)
security technology are dependable.
The capabilities provided by my organization’s information
security technology are reliable.
My organization’s information security technology behave in
a consistent way.
Security technical support
Our IT Support team does a good job of answering questions
regarding information security technology.
Out IT Support team is staffed by knowledgeable individuals
about information security technology.
When I have a question about information security
technology, our IT Support team is easily accessible.
When I have a question about information security
technology, our IT Support team is responsive to requests.
SETA availability
My organization provides training to help me improve my
awareness of information system security issues.
My organization provides me with education on information
security technology use.
In my organization, I am briefed on the consequences of
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.
My organization educates me on my information security
technology responsibilities.
In my organization, I am briefed on the consequences of
accessing information systems that I am not authorized to
use.

(Liang and
Xue 2010)

(D’Arcy and
Hovav 2009)
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Items
SETE1
SETE2
SETE3
SETE4

KS1
KS2
KS3

Dist1

Dist2

Dist3
Dist4

Dist5

Construct

Reference

SETA effectiveness
(Yoo et al.
My organization’s security education training increases my
2018)
knowledge on information security issues.
I understand the basic ideas of the security knowledge taught
in security training.
I try to apply the security knowledge I gained in information
security technology training.
My organization’s security training motivates me to integrate
the security knowledge learned into my work.
Security knowledge sharing
My organization encourages knowledge sharing to help deal
with new threats associated with information security
technology.
My organization emphasizes teamwork in dealing with new
information security technology problems.
In my organization, people are encouraged to help each other
when facing information security technology problems.
Security techno distress
How often have you been upset because of something that
happened unexpectedly with information security technology
while you are working?
How often have you felt that you were unable to control the
important things related to dealing with information security
technology?
How often have you felt that difficulties related to
information security technology were piling up so high that
you could not overcome them?
While dealing with information security technology for your
work tasks, how often have you felt nervous and stressed?
When encountering information security technology issue
while doing your work, how often have you found that you
could not cope with all of the things that you had to do?

Selfdeveloped

(Cohen et al.
1983)

45
Items
Eus1
Eus2
Eus3
Eus4

Eus5
Eus6

SC1
SC2
SC3
SC4
SC5

RM1
RM2
RM3
RM4
RM5

Construct
Security techno eustress
How often do you effectively cope with stressful changes
that occur due to information security technology
uncertainty?
How often do you deal successfully with irritating
information security technology hassles?
In general, how often do you feel motivated by your stress
related to information security technology?
In general, how often are you able to successfully control the
irritations in your work associated with information security
technology and threats?
When faced with information security technology stress,
how often do you find that the pressure makes you more
productive?
How often do you feel that you perform better on a work
task when under information security pressure?
Security carelessness
Not always treating sensitive data carefully.
Not checking sources when install new mobile apps for work
purpose.
Using public Wi-Fi to access or transmit work-related data.
Using work cloud-storage to store personal data.
Pasting or sticking passwords on office desks and other
locations.
IS resource misuse
Visiting nonrelated websites at work.
Downloading unauthorized software onto work devices (e.g.
computer, smartphone).
Not logging out of secure system after use.
Leaving one’s work laptop unattended.
Allowing others (e.g. family) to play with work laptop or
work devices.

Reference
(O’Sullivan
2011)

(Chu and
Chau 2014;
Ifinedo 2019)
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Items

Construct

Reference

SP1
SP2
SP3
SP4

Security procrastination
Not updating passwords on work devices.
Not updating passwords on work software.
Not updating work-related passwords regularly.
Not backing up data file frequently.

Pilot Test
The purpose of the pilot test was to make a final check on the quality of the scale
measurement items to assess any issues with the instrument to check for any potential
internal validity issues prior to moving forward with the actual study. In addition to using
previously validated questions, all measures were pretested and modified by two business
professors with expertise in survey research and three professionals with information
security technology experience. The pilot study data were used to check scale reliability;
it was not used in subsequent data analysis.

Pilot Test Reliability Analysis
Most of the scales were reliable because Cronbach’s alpha values were above 0.7,
which passed the suggested threshold for reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). However,
Cronbach’s alpha values of security techno-uncertainty, technical support, and eustress
are below 0.7 (See Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2
Cronbach’s Alpha Values of Security Techno-Uncertainty, Technical Support, and
Eustress
Scale
Security techno-overload
Security techno-uncertainty
Security techno-complexity
SETA Availability
SETA Effectiveness
Security techno-reliability
Technical Support
Distress
Eustress
Carelessness
Misuse
Procrastination

Cronbach’s alpha
0.687
0.485
0.844
0.682
0.766
0.749
0.536
0.929
0.806
0.691
0.904
0.918

Composite Reliability
0.916
0.686
0.902
0.792
0.847
0.916
0.744
0.946
0.832
0.953
0.928
0.939

AVE
0.687
0.473
0.761
0.437
0.582
0.687
0.427
0.780
0.483
0.745
0.722
0.753

Therefore, new items were extended and developed for the latent variables of
security techno-uncertainty and security technical support. At the same time, the
eustress’s outer loadings were evaluated to improve the average variance extracted
(AVE) in the actual data collection. The finalized version of the revised measurement is
in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3
Measurement of Outer Loadings of the Eustress
Items

Construct

Security techno-overload
STO1
I am forced by my organization’s information security
technology to work much faster in order to complete my
work.
STO2
I am forced by information security technology to do more
work than I can handle.
STO3
I am forced by information security technology to work
with very tight schedules.
STO4
I take too much care of my data protection on information
security technology.
STO5
Because of my organization’s information security
technology, I have to work faster to complete my work on
time.
Security techno-uncertainty
STU1
There are always new developments in the information
security technology we use in our organization.
STU2
There are frequent upgrades to the information security
technology in my organization.
STU3
There are always new information security technology
requirements in my job.
STU4_new My organization always notifies of upgrades for the
information security technology. (extended)

STC1
STC2
STC3

Security techno-complexity
I need a long time to understand and use new information
security technology.
I do not find enough time to upgrade my information
security technology skills.
I often find it too complex to understand and use new
information security technology.

Reference
Hwang and
Cha (2018)

(Hwang and
Cha 2018)
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Items

Construct

Security techno-reliability
STR1
The features provided by my organization’s information
security technology are dependable.
STR2
The capabilities provided by my organization’s
information security technology are reliable.
STR3
My organization’s information security technology
behaves in a consistent way.
STR4_new My organization uses dependable information security
technology.
Technical Support
TS1
Our IT Support team does a good job of answering
questions regarding information security technology.
TS2
Out IT Support team is staffed by knowledgeable
individuals about information security technology.
TS3
When I have a question about information security
technology, our IT Support team is easily accessible.
TS4
When I have a question about information security
technology, our IT Support team is responsive to requests.

SETA1
SETA2
SETA3
SETA4
SETA5

SETA Availability
My organization provides training to help me improve my
awareness of information system security issues.
My organization provides me with education on
information security technology use.
In my organization, I am briefed on the consequences of
modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.
My organization educates me on my information security
technology responsibilities.
In my organization, I am briefed on the consequences of
accessing information systems that I am not authorized to
use.

Reference
(Ayyagari
et al. 2011)

(Liang and
Xue 2010)

(D’Arcy
and Hovav
2009)
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Items
SETE1
SETE2
SETE3

SETE4

KS1

KS2
KS3

Dist1

Dist2

Dist3
Dist4

Dist5

Construct

Reference

(Yoo et al.
SETA Effectiveness
My organization’s security education training increases my 2018)
knowledge on information security issues.
I understand the basic ideas of the security knowledge
taught in security training.
I try to apply the security knowledge I gained in
information security technology training.
My organization’s security training motivates me to
integrate the security knowledge learned into my work.
Knowledge Sharing
My organization encourages knowledge sharing to help
deal with new threats associated with information security
technology.
My organization emphasizes teamwork in dealing with
new information security technology problems.
In my organization, people are encouraged to help each
other when facing information security technology
problems.
Security techno-distress
How often have you been upset because of something that
happened unexpectedly with information security
technology while you are working?
How often have you felt that you were unable to control
the important things related to dealing with information
security technology?
How often have you felt that difficulties related to
information security technology were piling up so high
that you could not overcome them?
While dealing with information security technology for
your work tasks, how often have you felt nervous and
stressed?
When encountering information security technology issue
while doing your work, how often have you found that you
could not cope with all of the things that you had to do?

Selfdeveloped

(Cohen et
al. 1983)
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Items
Eus1

Eus2
Eus3
Eus4

Eus5

Eus6
Eus7_new

SC1
SC2
SC3
SC4
SC5

Construct
Security techno-eustress
How often do you effectively cope with stressful changes
that occur due to information security technology
uncertainty?
How often do you deal successfully with irritating
information security technology hassles?
In general, how often do you feel motivated by your stress
related to information security technology?
In general, how often are you able to successfully control
the irritations in your work associated with information
security technology and threats?
When faced with information security technology stress,
how often do you find that the pressure makes you more
productive?
How often do you feel that you perform better on a work
task when under information security pressure?
How often do you feel that stress from information
security technology has a positive effect on the results of
your work? (extended)
Security Carelessness
Not always treating sensitive data carefully.
Not checking sources when install new mobile apps for
work purpose.
Using public Wi-Fi to access or transmit work-related data.
Using work cloud-storage to store personal data.
Pasting or sticking passwords on office desks and other
locations.
Not always treating sensitive data carefully.

SC6
RM1
RM2
RM3
RM4
RM5

IS Resources Misuse
Visiting nonrelated websites at work.
Downloading unauthorized software onto work devices
(e.g. computer, smartphone).
Not logging out of secure system after use.
Leaving one’s work laptop unattended.
Allowing others (e.g. family) to play with work laptop or
smart devices.

Reference
(O’Sullivan
2011)

(Chu and
Chau 2014;
Ifinedo
2019)

52
Items

Construct

Reference

SP1_new
SP2
SP3
SP4
SP5

Security Procrastination
Not updating mobile apps for work purpose.
Not updating passwords on work devices.
Not updating passwords on work software.
Not updating work-related passwords regularly.
Not backing up data file frequently.

Power Analysis
A power analysis was evaluated to determine the minimum number of samples
necessary for the study. Using the statistical test of linear multiple regression model with
R2 deviation from zero, G*Power 3.1 analysis was utilized to obtain a sufficient sample
size, estimating the sample size based on alpha level ( = 0.01), power (1 -  = 0.95), and
a medium effect size (2 = 1) (see Appendix E), with predictor variables within the model
(Hair et al., 2014). The result from the power analysis suggested that the minimum
adequate sample size for this study was 236; however, the actual dataset was 549.
Moreover, following the rule of thumb 10 times the largest number of structural paths
directed at a particular construct in the structural model, offers a rough guideline for
minimum sample size requirement (Hair et al., 2011; Marcoulides & Chin, 2013).

Actual Data Collection Procedures
It was important to prepare targeted participants with specific criteria on MTurk
to identify qualified participants for this study. Recent studies have emphasized that
Mturk panel is more diverse than individuals identified through traditional data sampling
techniques used in most behavioral research and would thus better generalize to the
general population than the previous sample techniques (Lowry et al., 2016; Steelman et
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al., 2015). Therefore, a few questions were published via a human intelligence task (HIT)
to assign the custom qualification criteria. Appendix D shows the requirements for
participating in the survey.
In order to increase the data quality, criteria settings were placed that only
accepted Mturk panels to participate in the study if and only if they had more than 5,000
Human Intelligence Tasks (HIT) approved, 98% HIT approval rate. They were located in
the United States. Each response included the worker ID of the participant, which was
used to assign the worker who meets the criteria to custom qualification. Workers’ ID
was important to identify (a) qualified to participate and (b) who participated in the pilot
study so they would not be invited to participate in the actual study. Potential participants
were directed to click on our survey link to read a consent form describing the research
and then decide whether to proceed with the survey. There were two screening questions,
asking whether there is an information security policy at their organization and whether
they use technological devices to perform their works (Appendix C). Only participants
who qualified for both these two conditions for their job duties at the workplace will
participate in the questionnaire.
In addition, there are several quality check questions mixed within the online
questionnaire, asking respondents to select a specific response if they are attentively
reading the question. If their answers to quality check questions were incorrect, the
survey terminated with a notice message, and the response was discarded. In addition,
further calculation of the mean (average) response time of 590 participants resulted in a
mean of eight minutes. Respondents’ response time of fewer than eight minutes was
checked and eliminated from the analysis. Moreover, several open-end questions were
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asked about respondents’ years of experience and current position tenure to strengthen
the response quality and check if their responses were attentive and prudent.
Only qualified participants were accepted for the actual study. Among the 590
participants, 548 met the quality criteria, almost 93% of the employees surveyed. They
were an adult employee who depend on information technology devices (i.e. laptop,
desktop, smartphone, etc.) to do their work and their organizations have information
security policy in effect.

CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS
There are two widely applied Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
techniques, namely Component-based SEM (commonly called PLS-SEM) and
Covariance-based SEM. These two SEM techniques are different in term of their
philosophies, distribution assumptions, and estimation objectives (Gefen et al., 2011).
The partial least squares (PLS) methodology was applied to empirically test the model
(Chin 1998).
PLS-SEM is an appropriate method in this research because (1) this study
seeks to predict the associations among constructs in a complex research model, and
also to build a theory in the context of information security technology, (2) the
research model’s data origin is survey data of 548 which exceeds the minimum
sample requirements of PLS (Hair et al., 2014, pg. 20). There are two advantages of
using PLS-SEM in this study. First, PLS offers flexibility in evaluating a structural
and measurement model where relationships have not been fully examined (Chin,
1998; Gefen et al., 2000; Hair et al., 2014). Second, PLS can be applied when
investigating a complex research model with many constructs and indicators (Hair et
al., 2014). Finally, PLS is able to handle both reflective and formative latent variables
(Lowry & Gaskin, 2014).
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 shows demographics. The 548 participants’ ages ranged from 20 to
73 years, with a mean of 39.34 years (standard deviation = 11.05). Of the participants,
52.7% (289) were male, and 47.3 % (259) were female. Two-thirds of the participants
(66.2%) at least had a two-year college degree or higher. There are 53.8% information
technology professional and 46.2% are end-user.

Table 4.1
Demographics
Subjects (n = 548)
Characteristic

Mean/Frequency

Age

39.34
Male = 289 (52.7%)
Female = 259 (47.3%)
High school = 38 (6.9%)
Two-year college = 60 (10.9%)
Bachelor’s = 303 (55.3%)
Master’s = 130 (23.7%)
Doctoral degree = 13 (2.4%)
Other = 4 (0.7%)
IT Professional = 295 (53.8%)
End-user = 253 (46.2%)
14.69
8.71

Gender

Education

Job Role
Work Experience (years)
IT Experience (years)

Standard
Deviation
11.05

11.25
9.39

Measurement Model
Bootstrapping was employed to facilitate the evaluation significance of model
path estimates. SmartPLS 3.3.2 was used for analyzing data (Ringle et al., 2015),
employing bootstrapping with 5,000 re-samples following (Hair et al., 2017). The
SmartPLS measurement model statistics include reliability, convergent validity,
discriminant validity, and common method variance.
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PLS analysis consists of two stages: (1) an assessment of the measurement
model and (2) the assessment of the structural model.
Internal reliability was tested for measurement model assessment using factor
loadings and composite reliability values. First, Cronbach’s alpha was analyzed to
estimate the reliability based on inter-correlations of the observed indicator variables.
In addition, composite reliability was also considered to check different outer loadings
of the indicators. Most of the latent variables and their indicators are good range
between 0.7 and 0.9; however, the average variance extraction (AVE) of eustress is
0.461, below the threshold of 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Therefore, that required
an evaluation of convergent validity since there were two items in the eustress with
low outer loadings, including eust1 and eust4 with outer loadings of 0.077 and 0.130.
Indicators with very low outer loading (below 0.4) were suggested to be eliminated
from the latent variable (Bagozzi et al. 1991; Hair et al. 2011). Therefore, the two
items were removed to improve the construct’s convergent validity. The average
variance extracted (AVE), which is equivalent to the communality of the construct,
was also improved to 0.792 after the two items were removed. Table 4.2 contains the
values supporting the conclusion of measurement instrument validity and reliability.
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Table 4.2
Construct Reliability and Validity
Composite
Reliability
0.955

Cronbach’s
Alpha
0.940

Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)
0.808

Security techno-uncertainty

0.833

0.783

0.712

Security techno-complexity

0.932

0.908

0.845

SETA Availability

0.888

0.836

0.692

SETA Effectiveness

0.842

0.745

0.654

Security techno-reliability

0.881

0.842

0.671

Security Technical Support

0.903

0.862

0.782

Knowledge Sharing

0.893

0.820

0.735

Security Techno-Distress

0.960

0.948

0.842

Security Techno-Eustress

0.884

0.827

0.628

Security Carelessness

0.938

0.912

0.791

Resource Misuse

0.943

0.925

0.796

Security Procrastination

0.956

0.943

0.814

Construct
Security techno-overload

All the factor loadings of items on their associated latent variables are higher
than 0.7 and were significant at p < 0.001; therefore, it suggests that the measurement
model has strong convergent validity. In fitting the model, composite reliabilities
(range from 0.842 to 0.956) confirm the internal reliability. Also, Cronbach’s alpha
(range from 0.745 to 0.948) suggests an internal consistency.
Discriminant validity was evaluated by comparing the square root of AVE to
the correlations among the constructs, as shown in Table 4.3. All are higher than the
correlations between the construct and the other variables, indicating that the
measurement model has strong discriminant validity.

1
0.89
0.34
0.69
0.14
0.08
-0.07
0.03
0.18
0.65
0.57
0.67
0.51
0.58
0.84
0.21
0.39
0.38
0.29
0.33
0.31
0.25
0.30
0.17
0.08
0.09

2

0.92
-0.01
-0.09
-0.18
-0.10
0.05
0.78
0.41
0.76
0.65
0.68

3

Note: the diagonal values (bold) represent the square root of AVE

1.Security techno-overload (STO)
2.Security techno-uncertainty (STU)
3.Security techno-complexity (STC)
4.SETA Availability (SETA)
5.SETA Effectiveness (SETE)
6.Security techno-reliability (STR)
7.Security technical support (TS)
8.Security knowledge sharing (KS)
9.Security techno-distress (Dist.)
10.Security techno-eustress (Eust.)
11.Security Carelessness (SC)
12.Resource Misuse (RM)
13.Security Procrastination (SP)

Correlations Table

Table 4.3

0.83
0.77
0.51
0.58
0.54
0.02
0.36
0.06
-0.05
-0.04

4

0.81
0.49
0.58
0.57
-0.02
0.33
0.01
-0.05
-0.06

5

0.82
0.53
0.48
-0.18
0.19
-0.16
-0.17
-0.19

6

0.88
0.50
-0.06
0.25
-0.02
-0.03
-0.06

7

0.86
0.06
0.32
0.08
-0.02
0.01

8

0.92
0.46
0.71
0.66
0.68

9

0.79
0.50
0.32
0.41

10

0.89
0.77
0.82

11

13

0.89
0.79 0.90

12
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Furthermore, the cross-loadings among all measurement items were checked.
Cross-loadings suggested indicators associated with construct should be greater than
any of its cross-loadings on other constructs. The results of these two tests indicated
that the measurement model has good discriminant and convergent validity, see Table
4.4.
Because of the dependent variable, counterproductive behaviors have a high
correlation, including misuse, carelessness, and procrastination; therefore, we argue
that these three constructs operationalize as a second-order construct with first-order
reflective and second-order formative to form the information security
counterproductive behaviors. The second-order constructs (security job demands,
security job resources, and security counterproductive behaviors) measurement
quality were evaluated by following the suggestions in previous studies and was
directly measured using items from all the first-order constructs (Bock et al., 2005;
Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Petter et al., 2007). Specifically, the repeated
indicator approach (also known as the hierarchical component model) was applied
based on the reflective-formative hierarchical component model testing results.
This approach measures the second-order factor using the observed latent
variables for loading all the first-order factors (Ciavolino & Nitti, 2013; Hair et al.,
2017). For formative second-order construct significance testing, job demands
weights from the first-order constructs: techno-overload, techno-uncertainty, and
techno-complexity to the second-order construct were 0.488, 0.197, and 0.512,
respectively. The t-statistics were greater than 1.96 in the 95% confidence interval
level.
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Table 4.4
Cross Loading
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Table 4.4 Notes:
STO = Security techno-overload; STU = Security techno-uncertainty; STC = Security technocomplexity; SETA = SETA Availability; SETE = SETA Effectiveness; STR = Security technoreliability; TS = Security technical Support; KS: Security knowledge sharing; Dist. = Distress; Eust. =
Eustress; SC = Carelessness; RM = Resource Misuse; SP = Security Procrastination

* = new items
Item1 = first-order latent variables
Second-order latent variables: security job demands comprised of STO, STU, and STC, security job
resources comprise of SETA, SETE, STR, TS, and KS.
Security counterproductive behavior comprises of SC, RM, and SP.

Regarding to security job resources, the weights from security awareness
training availability (SETA), security awareness training effectiveness (SETE),
security techno-reliability, technical support, and knowledge sharing were 0.307,
0.224, 0.256, 0.248, and 0.186, respectively, and the t-statistics were greater than
2.58, which met the formative construct specifications. Also, the path coefficient to
counterproductive behaviors from first-order constructs: security carelessness,
information systems resource misuse, and security procrastination were 0.389, 0.341,
0.316 with t-statistics much larger than the threshold t-value of 1.96.
Variance inflation factor (VIF) tests were performed to determine if
multicollinearity issues among the first-order constructs exist. The results show that
the VIF values of techno-overload, techno-uncertainty, and techno-complexity on the
second-order construct of security job demand were below the cutoff of 5 (2.343,
1.139, 2.156, respectively). VIF values of SETA, SETE, security techno-reliability,
technical support, and knowledge sharing on the job resources were also below the
threshold of 5 (2.781, 2.873, 1.855, 1.988, and 1.619). VIF values of security
carelessness, information systems resource misuse and security procrastination on the
counterproductive behaviors were (4.625, 4.768, and 4.028) (Lee et al., 2018; Hair et
al., 2013).
As a result, there are no concerns regarding problematic multicollinearity
association with the first-order components of security job demand, security job
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resource, and security counterproductive behavior (Hair et al., 2013; Petter et al.,
2007).

Common Method Variance
Common method bias is problematic in the study since data collection is
collected at one point in time, which refers to the amount of spurious covariance
shared among variables because of the common method used in data collection
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). The problem often exists in studies that use the survey
method when respondents take a single survey at the same point in time.
Several preventative steps recommended by (Podsakoff et al., 2003) were used
to mitigate the common method variance. These included steps including protecting
respondent anonymity, adding open text for participants’ position and occupation and
years of work experience and months in current position, and improving scale
measurements with different scale points and formats (7 Likert-scale “Strong
disagree” to “Strong agree,” bipolar scale) and marker variable (unrelated theoretical
construct, “blue attitude”) was used to report in the result that the steps work since
there is not CMV.
First, Harman’s single factor test was conducted. CMV is concerned if the
factor analysis results in a single factor or if one general factor accounts for more than
50% of the covariance. Based on the result of this factor analysis, the single largest
eigenvalue factor accounts for 33.88% of the variance, suggesting that the majority of
variance is not accounted for by just one single general factor and indicates that
problematic common method variance is unlikely.
Second, a marker variable analysis was employed using a three-item scale for
“blue attitude,” which is theoretically unrelated to the other main variables. Then, a
model was constructed with the added marker variable to the endogenous variable to
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assess the common method bias (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Tehseen et al., 2017). If
the mean correlation among all latent variables and the marker variable is more than
0.3, this indicates there is a common method bias issue (Tehseen et al., 2017). After
examining the mean correlation among all the variables and marker variables, the
result is 0.163, much less than the 0.3 thresholds (Tehseen et al., 2017). Therefore, it
suggests no evidence of problematic common method bias in this study.

Structural Model
The structural model was deployed in SmartPLS to evaluate the significance
and strength of each of the hypothesized effects. The research model provided greater
predictive efficacy for security techno-distress (R2 = 64.8%) than eustress (R2 = 39.1
%), and the R2 for counterproductive behaviors is 67.9 %. R2 values reflect the
amount of variance explained by the model or the model’s predictive power, are
presented within the oval of each endogenous variable. In this study, the model
accounted for more of the variance in distress than eustress Distress and eustress,
together, account for a moderate amount of the variance in counterproductive
behaviors.
Table 4.5 presents results related to the hypotheses derived from the research
model. Results indicate overall support for the model, with five of six hypotheses
supported (p < 0.001). The relationship between security job demands and distress
was significant ( = 0.825, p < 0.001), lending support to H1a. Job resources was
negatively associated with distress ( = -0.133, p < 0.001) while security job
resources was positively associated with eustress ( = 0.318, p < 0.001), that
supported the H2a and H2b. Furthermore, distress toward the security
counterproductive behaviors was positively associated ( = 0.594, p < 0.001).
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Table 4.5
Results
Hypotheses/Path
H1a: Security Job
demands->securitytechno distress
H1b: Security Job
demands->securitytechno eustress
H2a: Security Job
resources->securitytechno distress

Path
t-statistics p-value Support Effect Effect size
Coefficient
size (f2) interpret
0.825
47.138
<0.001
Yes 1.162 Large

0.529

16.295

<0.001

No*

0.330 Large

-0.133

5.063

<0.001

Yes

0.035 Small

H2b: Security Job
resources->securitytechno eustress

0.318

8.480

<0.001

Yes

0.073 Medium

H3:Security-techno
distress->Security
Counterproductive
Behaviors
H4:Security-techno
eustress->Security
Counterproductive
Behaviors

0.594

15.973

<0.001

Yes

0.717 Large

0.045

1.780

0.077

No

0.009 Negligible

* - H1b indicated a negative relationship, so H1b is not supported.
Therefore, the H3 was supported. Moreover, report the ƒ2 - Cohen et al. (2003)
Largest effect of distress 0.35. Guidelines for assessing ƒ2 are that values of 0.02,
0.15, and 0.35, respectively, represent small, medium, and large effects (Cohen, 1988)
of the exogenous latent variable.
R2 values of all endogenous constructs, the change in the R2 value when a
specified exogenous construct is omitted from the model can be used to evaluate
whether the omitted construct has a substantive impact on the endogenous constructs.
This measure is the ƒ2 effect size (Hair et al., 2017).
The hypotheses H1b and H4 (security job demands to eustress and securitytechno eustress to counterproductive behaviors) were not supported. H1b was
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opposite to the hypothesis ( = 0.529, p < 0.001), and H4 was not significant ( =
0.045, p = 0.077). The results of path model significance were represented graphically
in Figure 4.1.
It was also noted that the relationships on the endogenous variable
(counterproductive behaviors) with the control variables education, gender (dummy
variable male = 0, and female = 1), and self-efficacy were not statistically significant.
However, job role (dummy variable with IT = 0, non-IT = 1) had a statistically
significant negative relationship with security counterproductive behaviors
( = -0.218, p < 0.001) and age had a statistically significant negative relationship
with security counterproductive behavior ( = -0.162, p < 0.001).
Table 4.6 shows the total effects of security job demand and resource factors
on information security counterproductive behaviors. Based on the results, security
techno-distress shows the strongest effect on counterproductive behavior outcomes
(total effect = 0.777). Besides, security job demand factors have stronger effects on
information security counterproductive behaviors outcomes than resource factors.
Security techno-overload (total effect = 0.245), security techno-complexity (total
effect = 0.471), while security techno-uncertainty has insignificant effect (total effect
= 0.023).
Most of the security job resource factors do not significantly affect
information security counterproductive behavior outcomes except the security technoreliability (total effect = -0.065) and SETA (total effect = -0.073).

0.256*

0.197*

Security Job
Resources

Security Job
Demands

H2b 0.318*

H1a 0.825*

Security
TechnoEustress

2

R = 0.391

Security
TechnoDistress

2

R = 0.648

Figure 4.1: Model Result

Notes: * - Path p < 0.001; Path in dash is not significant (p > 0.05).

Knowledge
Sharing

Technical Support

Security technoreliability

SETA
Effectiveness

SETA Availability

Security technocomplexity

Security technouncertainty

Security technooverload

Counterproductive
Behaviors

2

0.341*

First-order Construct

R = 0.679

* Significance level < 0.001

Procrastination

Misuse

Carelessness
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Table 4.6
Total Effects of Antecedent Variables on Security Counterproductive Behaviors

Security techno-Overload -> CPB
Security techno-Uncertainty -> CPB
Security techno-Complexity -> CPB
SETA Availability -> CPB
SETA Effectiveness -> CPB
Security techno-Reliability -> CPB
Security Technical Support -> CPB
Security Knowledge Sharing -> CPB
Security techno-Distress -> CPB
Security techno-Eustress -> CPB
Education -> CPB
Gender -> CPB
Age -> CPB
Job role -> CPB
Self-efficacy -> CPB
Note: CPB – Security Counterproductive Behaviors

Effect Size
0.245
0.023
0.471
-0.073
-0.032
-0.065
-0.004
-0.013
0.777
0.056
-0.005
0.063
-0.162
-0.218
-0.035

t-stat
12.501
0.867
12.501
2.232
0.907
2.21
0.126
0.517
28.711
0.934
0.130
1.931
4.044
6.731
1.080

p-value
<0.001
0.386
<0.001
0.026
0.365
0.027
0.900
0.605
<0.001
0.077
0.897
0.051
<0.001
<0.001
0.792

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study aimed to examine the information security technostress creators
(hindrance stressors) and stress inhibitors (challenge stressors) on negative and positive
stress responses that eventually impact the counterproductive security behaviors. The first
message from this study is that the individual perception is important; it is not whether
dealing with information security technology is complex but whether employees see it as
complex or not. Therefore, it is important to simplify the information security complexity
to reduce employees’ perceptions of complexity, reducing their negative stress responses
and strengthening their positive stress responses.
Overall, this study’s findings indicate support for the research model, with four
out of six hypotheses supported (H1a, H2a, H2b, and H3), at the significant level p <
0.001. The path corresponding to H1b was significant but indicated a positive
relationship while hypothesizing a negative relationship. The findings indicate that
distress by far has the most positive significant effect on counterproductive behavior
outcomes. Also, total effects suggest that two factors among three security job demand
factors, security techno-overload (total effect = 0.245) and security techno-complexity
(total effect = 0.471), strongly affect security counterproductive behavior. These results
imply that reducing perceptions of information security technology complexity is
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useful for reducing counterproductive security behaviors. Reducing security technology
overload perceptions should also be useful.
On the other hand, the findings related to the effects of security job resource
factors on counterproductive behavior suggest that security techno-reliability (total effect
= -0.065) and SETA (total effect = -0.073) have significant effects on counterproductive
behaviors, which suggest that security techno-reliability may reduce the security distress
(bad stress) impacts of information security technology. The finding is consistent with
previous studies that suggest techno-reliability helps reduce individual strain (Ayaagari et
al., 2011), which implies in the information security technology context that if these
features and characteristics are reliable in their performance, then employees’ experience
is not stressful. Information security professionals should also consider emphasizing
security technology reliability and explaining how these features are important and
helpful in protecting employees’ and organizations’ digital assets. While the importance
of security training and awareness and availability (SETA) have been emphasized in
InfoSec literature (D’Arcy et al., 2009; D’Arcy et al., 2014; Herath & Rao, 2009; Posey
et al., 2014; Yoo et al., 2019), the results of this study indicate that only SETA awareness
has a significant effect on counterproductive behaviors; perceptions of SETA
effectiveness did not have a significant on counterproductive behaviors.
This study demonstrated that assisting and training employees could effectively
increase security techno-eustress since they may enhance the positive challenge stress
response and mitigate the negative stress response that eventually impacts employees’
tendency of counterproductive behaviors. Specifically, this study emphasized and
examined the two antecedents (security job demands and security job resources) that
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positively influence positive stress response (security-techno eustress) while the security
job demands positively affects negative stress response (security-techno distress) and job
resources negatively influence the distress. More interestingly, the findings show that job
resources including information security reliability, security awareness training
availability, security awareness training effectiveness, technical support, and knowledge
sharing are all helpful in mitigating the distress, and also have a significant positive
relationship on eustress suggesting that these factors encourage employees to prepare
well for challenges interacting with information security technology. This is consistent
with previous studies that recommended the SETA and technical support (Sykes, 2015;
Herath & Rao, 2009a; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Ragu-Nathan
et al., 2008).
The hypothesized negative relationship between job demands and eustress was
not supported since the security job demands had a significant positive effect on eustress.
A plausible explanation for the positive relationship between the security job demands
and eustress may be that those demands create the condition for eustress to exist because
there is no need to cope unless there is demand. If there is no demand or low demand,
there is no challenge; that is necessary eustress to be present. If there is no demand, there
is no need to find and experiment with a new way to complete tasks. Future research
should examine this relationship further (Hargrove et al., 2015).
Counterproductive behaviors (security procrastination, information systems
resource misuse, and security carelessness) are highly correlated because there is a
positive likelihood of employees committing to one behavior; the other two behaviors
may follow. The positively significant relationship between distress and
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counterproductive behaviors indicates that the stronger bad stress employees experience
caused by demands rooted in information security technology, the higher the chance that
they may engage in information security counterproductive behaviors. This finding is
consistent with (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Hwang & Cha, 2018), who found that
overwhelming stress on employees may increase incidents by insider actors.
The model is more effective at accounting for the variance in distress than
eustress. The relationship between eustress and counterproductive behaviors is
insignificant, so this study’s findings do not support previous studies that examined the
eustress, which suggested that eustress is good stress that helps mitigate negative
psychological outcomes (Califf et al., 2020; Hargrove et al., 2013; Simmons & Nelson,
2007). One plausible explanation for this result is that there is no motivation from the
employees’ positive stress response that makes them avoid counterproductive security
behaviors since employees may often prioritize achieving work goals over security.
Previous InfoSec studies suggested that employees are often pragmatic and care about
their job performance more than they care about information security. It is important to
evaluate employees’ performance not based on just business needs but also on
information security awareness as well (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2011).
This study followed Chu and Chau (2014)’s future research calls for research that
examines the effect of individual factors such as age that may influence employees’
probabilities of committing resource misuse or security careless. The study’s findings
show that job role and age have significantly negative relationships with distress and
counterproductive behaviors, which suggest that the older the employees become, the less
likely they will engage in counterproductive behaviors. Also, because older colleagues
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are risk-averse, they tend to have higher concerns and experience more distress than
younger colleagues regarding information security practice. Also, a plausible explanation
for the job role is consistent with the previous study that suggests non-IT employees often
deal with less demand than IT employees because IT employees have to deal with all the
technical and managerial security factors (Lee et al., 2016).

Theoretical Contributions
First, this study contributes to research by shedding light on the inter-correlations
of three specified security counterproductive behaviors: security carelessness,
information systems resource misuse, and security procrastination. The lack of empirical
studies on security counterproductive behaviors encourages the study of what demand
and resource factors may cause and minimize the counterproductive behaviors in
information security discipline, which answer the call for future research (Chu & Chau,
2014; Ifinedo, 2019). Also, some third variables might influence security
counterproductive behavior as correlation can be because of a causal relationship.
However, more likely, this case is that there might be a third variable that affects all of
these.
Second, security carelessness, security procrastination, and information systems
resource misuse share similar effects on counterproductive behaviors. This study
examines the robustness of the JD-R model with a negative behavioral outcome related to
the information security context. A counterproductive behavior has been conceptualized
and treated as a multidimensional construct in management and psychology disciplines
(Fox & Spector, 2005; Fox & Spector, 2001; Sackett, 2002; Dilert et al., 2007). The
InfoSec literature focuses on information security policy compliance intention, which
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does not sufficiently account for an intention-behavior gap and largely ignores other
types of information security behaviors (Cram et al., 2019). This study attempted to bring
attention to the three counterproductive information security behaviors to understand
further employees’ behaviors interacting with information security technology.
Third, this study integrates JD-R and technostress-trifecta to examine and identify
relevant security demand and resource factors that may impact security distress
(detrimental stress) and eustress (beneficial stress) and the total effect of these two types
of stress responses (negative and positive stress response) toward security
counterproductive behavior outcome. Each has different concepts and relationships
among these two constructs (Tarafdar et al., 2017).
Finally, this study looked at security-related stress, mainly focusing on the
information security technology aspect, which has not been examined previously. This
study also further includes the security demands and security resources from the JD-R
framework. While previous security-related technostress mainly focused on negative
aspects (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Hwang & Cha, 2018; Hwang & Cha, 2021), information
system resources organizations often have to tackle or mitigate security threats, and was
the positive stress response were ignored. This study’s findings suggest that security job
demands and security job resources explain a large portion of distress, but smaller yet
still highly significant of eustress variance. More importantly, CPB is all about distress,
and eustress does not make any difference.

Practical Contributions
Security job demands and resources explain the large portion of the variance in
distress but a smaller but still highly significant portion of the variance in techno-eustress.
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These findings imply that organizations should provide sufficient resources related to
security and should also consider intervention programs to reduce distress related to using
security technologies. Also, the effect of distress on counterproductive behaviors
indicates that organizations may find it useful to understand better how to help employees
deal with ever-changing and complex information security technologies. When firms
invest in more new information security technology, these new technologies require
employees to put more effort into completing work-related tasks, which may cause
distress. Also, using these technologies may consume a large amount of employees’ time
due to the need to update knowledge and gather necessary skills to deal with the upgrades
on new information security technology. As a result, employees will find a way to engage
in security counterproductive behavior when they are expected to get work-related tasks
done. Therefore, management needs to care about employees’ security techno-distress.
Management and information technology departments may also need to be mindful of
seeking solutions to minimize employees’ information security counterproductive
behaviors; they should clearly emphasize which are dangerous and may make employees
and organizations vulnerable to cyber threats. At the same time, it is important to provide
more simplified explanations about security procedures to reduce complexity and think
about a balanced strategy to mitigate security techno-overload. Also, it is important to
align security objectives and employees’ goals. IT and Management departments need to
pay careful attention to balancing security needs such as automatic updates and password
change frequency with the need to efficiently complete work tasks. Otherwise, employees
may act in counterproductive ways to the organization’s security goals.
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Counterproductive behavior has only effect from techno-distress but not from
techno-eustress. Distress shows the largest effect from the findings; therefore, it is
suggested that organizations may consider designing a meditation or stress relief or
mindfulness training for employees to reduce negative stress experiences.
The findings give managers a clearer picture of how some forms of information
security counterproductive behaviors, security carelessness, information systems resource
misuse, and security procrastination could be interrelated. That means once employees
engage in one of the security counterproductive behaviors, they are more likely to engage
in the other two. The three instruments may help design decision support systems and
provide knowledge in developing systems for security decision-making and planning in
organizations. Practitioners need to proactively strengthen security education and training
awareness to emphasize the dangers of counterproductive behaviors across different
information technology devices that employees use for their work tasks. Security
awareness training needs to emphasize all three activities, including encouraging the
good security routine of updating passwords, carefully considering appropriate
information systems resource use such as double-checking software sources, and
constantly logging out of systems after use. Also, managers may try to frame SETA and
find a technological solution to reduce security complexity and workload. This study
provides organizations with measures to consider managing employees’ technostress and
stress response experienced from information security technology as an important
strategy to improve information security and mitigate security incidents incurred by
insider actors. Hopefully, the findings encourage managers to have older employees train
and advise younger colleagues and design culture of knowledge sharing and raise more
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awareness toward the younger employees who are more risk-taking and often more likely
to participate in security counterproductive behaviors.

Limitations and Future Research
While the study was developed and based on a reasonable theoretical framework
and was tested with a reliable survey instrument, limitations were still present that could
be addressed in future research. First, the study examined only one behavioral outcome,
while psychological outcomes were not considered. Second, this study used a crosssectional approach by collecting data at a single point in time, limiting the ability to make
definitive claims regarding causality. As with any empirical study relying on selfreported data, the results could be subject to response and social desirability biases.
Third, there might often be a possibility of inherent social desirability bias from the selfreport process from respondents. Fourth, although there was unlikely multicollinearity
among the first-order constructs on the formative second-order constructs of security job
demand, security job resource, and the counterproductive behaviors, the first-order
constructs on the counterproductive behaviors may need to be further evaluated in the
future study due to close VIFs value to the threshold of 5.
Psychological and behavioral outcomes are associated with the job demandresources framework (Bakker & Demerouti, 2017). This study looked at the only
behavioral outcome, which is the counterproductive behaviors (carelessness, misuse, and
procrastination); therefore, future research is encouraged to explore further the
psychological and well-being outcomes such as exhaustion, job satisfaction,
psychological contract fulfillment, to understand further the causal effects of resources
and demands employee-information security technology interaction that influence on
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employee’s outcomes. In addition, more recent JD-R suggests the concept of personal
resources (i.e., optimism, self-esteem, resilience), which refers to beliefs about how much
control an individual has over their environment (Bakker & Demerouti, 2014; Bakker &
Demerouti, 2017). This study did not include personal resources, and future studies are
encouraged to examine and investigate them.
Changes over time represent an important factor not considered in this study.
Future research may examine the changing effects in security distress and security
eustress. For future research, the longitudinal approach could be helpful to gain a better
understanding of causality when examining the relationship between these constructs in
different points in time.
Furthermore, Lazarus and Launier (1978) view stress as a process involving a
transaction between the individual and the environment appraisal process and coping
process. Problem-focused coping, such as task or technology experimentation, may be
associated with eustress that mediates the effect of eustress on outcomes. On the other
side, avoidance coping associated with distress, such as withdrawal or venting, may
affect the security behavioral outcomes.
As with any empirical study relying on self-reported data, the results are subject
to response and social desirability biases. We attempted to counter these effects by
carefully designing the questionnaire and ensuring anonymity and confidentiality.
Moreover, we applied statistical techniques to identify dishonest reporting (e.g., we
included control items to check if participants carefully read the instructions) and
checked the validity and reliability of our results. Nevertheless, future work can further
explore the effects using different experimental or mixed methods methodologies.
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Finally, future research may design experimental studies that look at different
approaches with two- or three levels at security techno-complexity and security technooverload to further understand and strengthen the internal validity to demonstrate a causal
relationship between security techno-complexity and overload with security
counterproductive behaviors. In addition, two potential variables, including the level of
complexity and novelty, could be manipulated through the experimental scenarios with
high and low. Two-by-two experimental studies would also be helpful to consider nature
of task(s) that future study may look at specific tasks and the degree of routine & nonroutine since cognitive may be lower when employees do routine tasks. Furthermore,
future research could design scenario-based and experiment studies based on the findings
to leverage more important situational details in operationally characterizing the decisionmaking leading to the violation (Klepper & Nagin, 1989). Because the scenario-based
approach provides a hypothetical other and their behavior in purely scenario-based terms,
respondents will be less likely to conceal their intentions and reactions in response to the
manipulation (Trevino, 1992).
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Screening Questions:

1. Do you depend on information technology devices (laptop, desktop, smartphone, etc.) to do
your work?


Yes



No

2. Does your organization have an information security policy?


Yes



No
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